These case studies show how banks, super funds and other participants can share fraud signals through Alerra to detect threats earlier, stop scams and protect more Australians.
Different perspectives. A safer Australia.
Illustrative scenarios. These cases are constructed to show how
cross-institution fraud intelligence works. They do not describe real events,
real customers or real institutions; Bank A, Bank B, Bank C, Super A and Super
Fund B are fictional labels; every figure is chosen for illustration rather than
measured; and the participant quotes are written illustrations, not customer
testimonials. No financial institution is connected to Alerra.
Case study 1
Super Rollover Scam
A single rollover request. A wider network of risk.
A member requests a large rollover to a newly established SMSF. Individually, it can look legitimate. With Alerra, the destination account, device and contact details are recognised across multiple institutions as part of an emerging scam.
What the super fund sees
Rollover request: $385,000
Email changed (yesterday)
Phone changed (yesterday)
New device
Newly established SMSF
Looks legitimate on its own.
What Alerra discovers
Destination account opened 12 days ago (Bank A)
2 scam reports (Bank B)
Another rollover in progress (Super Fund B)
5 institutions linked
High-risk destination across the network.
Outcome
Rollover held. Member verified. $385,000 protected.
“We would not have seen this without Alerra.”
Super Fund Participant
Signal
Contact details change
The member's email and phone are updated from a device the fund has never seen, one day before a $385,000 rollover request is lodged.
Match
Destination recognised
Alerra matches the destination account to a Bank A account opened 12 days ago, already carrying two scam reports from Bank B.
Context
A second fund is exposed
Super Fund B is processing another rollover to the same destination. Five institutions are linked to the same identity and device fingerprint.
Action
Held and verified
The fund holds the payment and verifies the member out of band. Super Fund B is alerted in time to hold its rollover as well.
Case study 2
Cross-Bank Mule Network
Different customers. Same destination. Same pattern.
Multiple banks see individual transactions to a new account. Alerra connects the dots, revealing a mule account receiving funds from many victims and rapidly moving money to crypto exchanges.
“We stopped payments other banks hadn’t yet seen.”
Bank Participant
Signal
One ordinary payment
A customer sends money to a new payee. To the sending bank it is a single transfer from a long-standing account with no history of scam reports.
Match
The same destination, again
Alerra recognises the destination across five participating banks: 14 unrelated senders have paid into a 21-day-old account.
Context
Money leaves fast
More than $620,000 has arrived and is being moved out to crypto exchanges within minutes of each deposit — classic mule behaviour.
Action
Blocked at the network edge
In-flight payments are blocked, the account is flagged to every participant, and victims are contacted before further transfers are sent.
Case study 3
Cross-Institution Identity Takeover
One identity. Multiple attacks. A bigger picture.
A criminal takes over a person's identity and attacks several institutions over a few days. Each organisation sees a single, seemingly ordinary event. Alerra identifies the pattern in real time.
What each institution sees
Mon – Bank A: password reset
Tue – Bank B: mobile changed
Wed – Super A: email changed
Thu – Super A: rollover initiated
Thu – Bank C: new account opened
Each event looks routine on its own.
What Alerra discovers
Identity velocity anomaly
5 identity/security events
4 institutions
4 days
3 new devices
2 new IP ranges
1 large super rollover
Coordinated identity takeover across the network.
Outcome
Account takeover stopped. Further losses prevented. Identity protected.
“Alerra gave us the context we needed to act, fast.”
Super Fund Participant
Monday
Credentials reset
Bank A processes a password reset. Nothing about it looks unusual, and the customer does not report a problem.
Tuesday – Wednesday
Contact details move
Bank B changes the mobile number and Super A changes the email address, each from a device new to that institution.
Thursday
The pattern surfaces
Five identity events across four institutions in four days, on three devices and two new IP ranges, trigger an identity velocity anomaly.
Within minutes
Coordinated response
Super A holds the rollover, Bank C freezes the newly opened account, and every linked participant verifies the customer directly.
Detect earlier
See emerging threats in real time.
Prevent more
Turn single events into network intelligence.
Protect Australians
Stronger together.
Be part of the solution
Join the founding network
Help build a safer, more resilient Australia through collective fraud intelligence.